Does Community-based Health Insurance Have Potential Impacts on Direct and Indirect Outcomes? Evidence from Rural Villages, Savannakhet Province, Lao People’s Democratic Republic by Sydavong, Thiptaiya & Goto, Daisaku
  
Does Community-based Health Insurance Have 
Potential Impacts on Direct and Indirect Outcomes? 
Evidence from Rural Villages, Savannakhet Province, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 
 
 
 
 
 
Thiptaiya Sydavong 
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC) 
Hiroshima University 
 
Daisaku Goto 
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC) 
Hiroshima University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IDEC DP2 Series                            Vol. 7 No. 6 
Department of Development Policy 
Division of Development Science 
Graduate School for International  
Development and Cooperation (IDEC) 
Hiroshima University 
1-5-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-hiroshima  
7398529 Japan 
Does Community-based Health Insurance Have
Potential Impacts on Direct and Indirect
Outcomes?
Evidence from Rural Villages, Savannakhet
Province, Lao People’s Democratic Republic
Thiptaiya SYDAVONG
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC)
Hiroshima University
1-5-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8529, Japan
E-mail: tasydavong@yahoo.com
Daisaku GOTO
Graduate School for International Development and Cooperation (IDEC)
Hiroshima University
1-5-1 Kagamiyama, Higashi-Hiroshima 739-8529, Japan
E-mail: dgoto@hiroshima-u.ac.jp
Abstract
Background: As labor-intensive agriculture is a common way of life for
rural people, especially in developing countries, good health is often a key
input of agriculture production. In addition, selling livestock is a form
of coping responses of rural people when facing financial burden. If the
community-based health insurance (CBHI) scheme achieves its key function
in financial protection and better health promotion, it is assumed to lead to
improved outcomes of agriculture production.
Objective: To evaluate potential impacts of the CBHI scheme on rice
production and livestock holdings among rural households in Savannakhet
Province, Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR).
Method: We employed the technique of inverse probability of treatment
weight (IPTW) to correct for imbalances in pre-intervention covariates be-
tween treated and untreated samples.
Results: Findings from this study suggests that the CBHI scheme signif-
icantly increases rice production per capita and the number of cow holdings
among enrolled households, which both are likely to lead to poverty reduc-
tion in the long run.
Key words: Community-based health insurance; Inverse probability of
treatment weight; Rural Lao PDR.
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1 Introduction
By reason of irregular occupation and income level, informally em-
ployed individuals are often not counted in any payroll-based health insur-
ance schemes and continue to suffer from the high cost of seeking health
care. Over two decades, the community-based health insurance (CBHI)
scheme has been implemented as an attempt to provide financial protection
and health equity for those people in developing countries (Mathauer et al.,
2017). The scheme enrollment is on a voluntary basis, and the pooling of
health risk and prepayment typically occur at the community level. Under
the risk-pooling system, individuals financial burdens are spread across all
scheme members making health care more affordable for the poor. There-
fore, beneficiaries are protected against catastrophic costs of illness while
ensuring their right to equal access to health services based on their needs.
To ensure that the specific health insurance scheme leads to develop-
ment outcomes, the impacts of the action for people in the informal sector is
evaluated by extensive literature. For instance, Spann (2012) concluded in a
systematic review on the impact of health insurance in Africa and Asia that
the intervention significantly improved financial protection and enhanced
service utilization, but weak evidences on social inclusion, quality of care,
and community empowerment were found. Further, a report reviewed by
Acharya et al. (2012) on the impact of health insurance schemes for the
informal sector in low- and middle-income countries found contradictory re-
sults of no strong evidence on utilization, financial protection, and health
status. It is noticed that most of the previous studies primarily examined
the impacts of specific health insurance on immediate outcomes of finan-
cial protection and health service utilization (Jutting, 2004; Nguyen et al.,
2011; Alkenbrack & Lindelow, 2015; Raza et al., 2016). However, existing
evidence of such immediate benefits from developing countries are rather
divergent and inconsistent.
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Beyond the direct effects, the potential benefits of health insurance
might be found on indirect outcomes resulting from less out-of-pocket ex-
penditures (OOPs), fast recovery of illness, or improved health status. In
developing countries, people living in rural areas often depend on labor-
intensive agriculture for subsistence and livelihoods, inevitably health status
and agriculture production are correlated in multiple ways. Good health is
an asset for agriculture production as they can work more (Asenso-Okyere
et al., 2011), whereas poor health reduces the capacity to work of the sick in-
dividual and the level of output, accordingly (Antle & Pingali, 1994). More-
over, when rural dwellers encounter ill-health, which leads to higher OOPs
and income loss, the common coping responses in the absence of sufficient
cash savings are selling livestock, assets, or borrowing to finance health care
treatment (Sauerborn et al., 1996; Yilma et al., 2014).
There are few studies that examine these hypotheses empirically. Par-
mar et al. (2011) evaluated whether the CBHI scheme protects household
assets in rural Burkina Faso. The assets are defined by the monetary value
of goods and livestock owned by the households. Parmar et al. (2011) found
that the scheme participation leads to increasing household assets. Another
interesting study is the work of Yilma et al. (2015) that assessed the im-
pact of the CBHI scheme on household consumption, income, indebtedness,
and livestock holdings in Ethiopia. The findings showed that the CBHI
scheme reduced reliance on coping response, especially borrowing, but no
evidence on livestock holdings was found. Due to the limited works on the
indirect benefits of the CBHI scheme, more empirical evidence is needed, in
particular, impacts on agriculture production.
The impacts of the CBHI scheme on the indirect outcomes of informal-
sector households in rural villages of Lao People’s Democratic Rupublic
(PDR) is an appropriate case in point to test the hypotheses. Like many
other developing countries, in order to promote health equity for self-employed
people, the government of Lao PDR has focused on the implementation of
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the CBHI scheme since 2002. As the majority of the targeted population
resides in remote villages and mainly depends upon labor-intensive rice pro-
duction for income earning and subsistence, we hypothesize that the CBHI
scheme increases rice yield and the number of livestock holdings of rural
households. Thus, the objectives of this study are to investigate the impacts
of the CBHI scheme on the rice production and livestock holdings among
rural households in Savannakhet Province, Lao PDR. Based on subsample
analysis, two additional research questions are examined:
1. Do the impacts vary in the presence and absence of CBHI ex-members?
2. Are the impacts divergent in the presence and absence of households
engaged in the village fund?
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section is
the overview of the CBHI scheme in Lao PDR. Section three describes the
methodology including sample selection and the econometric model. Section
four discusses the results and main findings. The conclusion is located in
Section five.
2 CBHI scheme in Lao PDR
In Lao PDR, health risk is expected to be an increasing threat to
the poor in particularly remote areas (World Health Organization, 2012),
where the majority of the population remains dependent on agricultural
activities for subsistence and the infrastructure is inadequate. Therefore,
the government is concerned with strengthening the health system health
financing schemes in particular to ensure health equity for all groups in the
population.
To improve the health system, the government launched four health
financing schemes targeting specific groups in the population, including
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State Authority Social Security (SASS) for government workers, Social Secu-
rity Organization (SSO) for salaried private and state-owned enterprise em-
ployees, Health Equity Funds (HEFs) for the extreme poor, and Community-
Based Health Insurance (CBHI) for non-poor workers in the informal sector
(Ahmed et al., 2013). Among the four schemes, only the CBHI scheme is
based on voluntary membership and decentralized implementation.
As of 2014, only 27.2% of the population was covered by any scheme
of the health financing system. Moreover, the decomposed coverage by a
scheme is rather heterogeneous. While the coverage of the SASS and HEF
schemes, which targets nearly 26.5% of the Lao population, achieved ap-
proximately 85% of the target, that of the HEFs and CBHI schemes made
little progress, with only 6.4% of the targeted group enrolled. In particu-
lar, the CBHI scheme, which targets approximately two-thirds of the Lao
population, achieved only 3.7% of the target by 2014 (National Health Bu-
reau, 2014). In other words, the CBHI scheme has the largest target but
lowest achievement. Therefore, this study intentionally evaluates the CBHI
scheme for three main reasons: 1. the scheme is voluntary, 2. the targeted
population is mainly the poor in rural areas with limited infrastructure and
geographic constraints, and 3. the scheme has made extremely slow progress
towards the given target.
In 2002, the Ministry of Health (MOH) introduced the CBHI scheme
as a pilot project in two districts with technical assistance from the WHO
and financial support from the United Nations Human Security Fund. As of
September 2015, the scheme was available in 50 of the 148 districts in 17 of
the 18 provinces, which is equivalent to 2,271 of the 8,507 villages. The total
number of beneficiaries is reported at 33,795 households (179,534 people).
Currently, the benefit package of the CBHI scheme covers outpatient and
inpatient services, including primary health care, specialist services, diag-
nostic tests, and prescribed pharmaceuticals that are available in hospitals.
The household is the unit of enrollment, and the premiums vary depending
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on urban or rural residence and the number of household members. The
premium rates have not been updated since 2005 (World Bank, 2010). The
window period of service access is three months upon enrollment. With the
gatekeeping system, CBHI members have to first seek services at contracting
facilities, such as dispensaries and district hospitals, and only referral pa-
tients are sent to provincial or regional hospitals (Annear et al., 2011). Since
2012, 50% of the schemes revenue has come from premium collection, and
the other 50% has come from government subsidization (Lao Government,
2012).
3 Methodology
3.1 Sample selection and data collection
This study collects data of rural households in Savannakhet Province,
which is located in the center of Lao PDR. The province has the largest land
area and population size. According to the Center National Health Insur-
ance (NHI) Bureau report in 2015, Savannakhet Province had the largest
and most fluctuating number of CBHI members of all the provinces. The
household survey is carried out in two districts from September 13-27, 2016
and included 580 self-employed households randomly drawn from eight vil-
lages. Samples are recruited by a three-stage sampling technique according
to the following reasons:
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• There are 15 districts in Savannakhet Province. Since 2014, eight of
the districts reported increasing numbers of CBHI-enrolled households,
while the remaining districts have faced a decreasing number of CBHI
members over time. Note that the province capital district needs to
be removed from our selection because its infrastructure differs from
that of the other districts. To ensure that the results account for the
views of heterogeneous respondents, we intentionally select two rep-
resentative districts with increasing and decreasing numbers of CBHI
members. Accordingly, we choose Champhone and Xaibouly Districts,
which have the largest coverage of CBHI among increasing and de-
creasing districts1, for this study.
• As our focus is households in remote areas, to ensure that the experi-
ment can plausibly be conducted in these areas, we purposively desig-
nate only type II villages with a homogeneous infrastructure surveil-
lance of “1 1 0 1 1 1 0”2 . Finally, we identify three villages in
Champhone District and six villages in Xaibouly District. However,
one village in Xaibouly District is removed due to accessibility con-
straints.
• All informal-sector households3 , which are the targets of the CBHI
scheme, are eligible for this study. However, in practice, we purposely
omit monks because interviews with them are implausible. The eligible
population is stratified into three groups: CBHI active members, non-
members, and ex-members. Member respondents are randomly drawn
from a list of currently active CBHI members in each village, whereas
ex-members are randomly selected from a list of those who dropped
out before August 2016. Non-members are randomly selected from a
list of households in each village excluding households that work in for-
mal sectors (employed households), member households and dropout
households. Finally, there are 580 stratified random samples, repre-
senting 46% of the eligible population. Our samples comprise 210
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(36%), 72 (13%), and 298 (51%) active members, ex-members, and
non-members, respectively.
The sample households are asked about demographic characteris-
tics, asset endowment, income and expenditure sources, financial activities,
CBHI scheme and health related information, social networks, and house-
hold shocks during the last 12 months preceding the survey visit. Investi-
gators are employed and trained based on the content of the questionnaire.
The questionnaire is pretested prior to the main survey.
As is customary, we visit the chief of each village a few days before-
hand to inform the objectives and tentative procedure of the experiment.
Once the list of random respondents is recruited, a day prior to the experi-
ment the village chief announces the names of assigned household members
to show up with the family book and CBHI member card (if his/her house-
hold was enrolled in the CBHI scheme) at the given location (usually at
temples). For convenience, every 6 respondents are appointed one-hour in-
tervals from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m.
To test the null hypothesis and answer two additional research ques-
tions, the samples are managed in the following categories:
• Full sample: we pool CBHI members, non-members, and ex-members
(as untreated subjects) regardless if subjects simultaneously engaged
in the village fund (hereinafter referred to as “VF subjects”)4.
• Subsample 1: To observe the results in the absence of the CBHI ex-
members, subsample 1 is equivalent to the full sample minus the ex-
members.
• Subsample 2: Similarly, subsample 2 equals the full sample subtracting
the VF subjects.
• Subsample 3: This category is especially the focus of our efforts as
both the ex-members and VF subjects are removed.
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Table 1 shows the description and measurement of the treatments,
potential covariates, and outcome variables employed in this study. To ad-
dress the impact variation associated with household size, we observe both
aggregate and per capita outcomes. Summary statistics of the full sample
and subsamples of treated and untreated households are presented in Table
2. The mean different test shows that the comparison groups have con-
sistently significant differences on certain pre-intervention characteristics,
especially household head age and education, household size, toilet avail-
ability in the household, engagement in village party and women union, and
average distance from the village to the district hospital. These differences
in baseline characteristics would lead to difference in selected outcomes even
in the absence of the CBHI scheme enrollment. In particular, the differences
are significant for aggregate expenditures, expenditures on education, food,
other goods, rice yield, number of cows and poultry holdings. However, the
imbalance of baseline characteristics is solved by the IPTW technique as
shown in Table 3.
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Table 1: Variable description and measurements
Variable Type Measurement
Treatment
CBHI member Dummy 1 if households are currently the members of CBHI scheme, 0 otherwise
Potential covariates
Household head
Gender Dummy Gender of the household head. 1 if male, 0 otherwise
Age Continuous Age of household head in years
Household
Size Continuous Number of individuals living in the same household
Land Continuous Agricultural land holding size in square meters
Toilet Dummy Toilet availability in the household. 1 if have, 0 otherwise
Village partya Dummy Any member in the household is member of village party. 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Women union Dummy Any member in the household is member of women union. 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Village
Distance Discrete Average distance from the village to the district hospital in kilometers
Behavior
α Continuous The degree of respondents risk aversion towards probability prospectb
Outcomes variablesc
Income Continuous Total income in 1,000LAK
Income per capita Continuous Total income per capita in 1,000LAK
Expenditure Continuous Total expenditure in 1,000LAK
Expenditure per capita Continuous Total expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
Health Continuous Health expenditure in 1,000LAK
Health per capita Continuous Health expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
Education Continuous Education expenditure in 1,000LAK
Food Continuous Food expenditure in 1,000LAK
Food per capita Continuous Food expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
Transportation Continuous Transportation expenditure in 1,000LAK
Transportation per capita Continuous Transportation expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
Energy Continuous Energy expenditure in 1,000LAK (including electricity, gas, wood, charcoal, oil, etc.)
Energy per capita Continuous Energy expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
Water Continuous Water expenditure in 1,000LAK
Water per capita Continuous Water expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
Telephone Continuous Telephone expenditure in 1,000LAK
Telephone per capita Continuous Telephone expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
Maintenance Continuous Maintenance expenditure in 1,000LAK (including money paid for fixing agricultural
assets, houses, vehicles, etc.)
Maintenance per capita Continuous Maintenance expenditure per capita in 1,000LAK
Other expenditures Continuous Other expenditures in 1,000LAK (including investment, livestock purchasing, association
fee, donations, rent, clothes, cosmetics, etc.)
Other expenditures per capita Continuous Other expenditures per capita in 1,000LAK
Hospitalization Dummy Any member in the household hospitalized. 1 if yes, 0 otherwise
Rice Continuous Paddy rice yield in kilograms
Rice per capita Continuous Paddy rice yield per capita in kilograms
Cow Continuous Number of cow owned
Poultry Continuous Number of poultry owned
a Village party and women union are the local government authorities.
b Kahneman and Tversky (1979) suggested that individuals tend to overweigh low-probabilities which may favor of both lottery and insurance. The
function would be linear if α = 1, but S-shaped and inverted S-shaped if α > 1 and 0 < α < 1, respectively. Inverted-S shape of probability weighting
function favors risk-seeking and risk-averse preferences for small-probability and moderate- or high-probability prospects of losses, respectively (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992). As stated in the study of Gonzalez and Wu (1999), probabilities below 30% are treated as small-probabilities. We employed the risk
elicitation method of Tanaka et al. (2010) to obtain the parameter. The details on methodology and results of the experiment are reported in a separate
paper. The parameter represents the behavior variable of the respondents in which 88.45% of our respondents are household heads or spouses.
c The various income and expenditure categories, hospitalization, and rice yield are data in the last 12 months preceding the survey.
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Full sample Subsample 1 Subsample 2 Subsample 3
Treated Control Mean difference Treated Control Mean difference Treated Control Mean difference Treated Control Mean difference
n Mean n Mean Diff S.E. n Mean n Mean Diff S.E. n Mean n Mean Diff S.E. n Mean n Mean Diff S.E.
Potential covariates
Gender 210 0.84 369 0.85 -0.013 0.03 210 0.84 297 0.85 -0.01 0.03 141 0.82 267 0.87 -0.05 0.04 * 141 0.82 224 0.87 -0.05 0.04 *
Age 210 51.4 369 49.42 1.98 1.16 ** 210 51.4 297 48.91 2.49 1.2 ** 141 50.9 267 50.48 0.42 1.43 141 50.9 224 50.21 0.69 1.47
Education 210 5.06 369 4.13 0.93 0.33 *** 210 5.06 297 3.91 1.14 0.34 *** 141 5.55 267 4.16 1.39 0.4 *** 141 5.55 224 3.92 1.64 0.4 ***
Size 210 6.37 370 5.67 0.7 0.18 *** 210 6.37 298 5.62 0.75 0.2 *** 141 6.2 268 5.69 0.51 0.22 ** 141 6.2 225 5.68 0.52 0.23 **
Toilet 210 0.86 370 0.71 0.16 0.04 *** 210 0.86 298 0.67 0.19 0.04 *** 141 0.92 268 0.72 0.21 0.04 *** 141 0.92 225 0.69 0.23 0.04 ***
Land 210 17.87 370 17.77 0.01 1.90 210 17.87 298 1.85 -0.63 2.07 141 18.1 268 17.46 0.63 2.48 141 18.1 225 18.19 0.09 2.64
Village party 210 0.1 370 0.04 0.06 0.02 *** 210 0.1 298 0.04 0.06 0.02 *** 141 0.1 268 0.04 0.05 0.03 ** 141 0.1 225 0.04 0.05 0.03 **
Women union 210 0.3 370 0.21 0.09 0.04 *** 210 0.3 298 0.19 0.1 0.04 *** 141 0.32 268 0.20 0.12 0.04 *** 141 0.32 225 0.18 0.14 0.05 ***
Distance 210 14.79 370 16.36 -1.57 0.46 *** 210 14.79 298 16.75 -1.97 0.48 *** 141 14.37 268 16.54 -2.17 0.55 *** 141 14.37 225 16.93 -2.56 0.56 ***
α 210 0.74 370 0.69 0.05 0.03 ** 210 0.74 298 0.69 0.05 0.03 ** 141 0.71 268 0.69 0.03 0.03 141 0.71 225 0.70 0.01 0.04
Outcome variables
Income 210 16,573.91 370 14,511.02 2,062.89 1,939.84 210 16,573.91 298 14,898.23 1,675.68 2,126.44 141 16,343.73 268 14,133.89 2,209.84 2,136.43 141 16,343.73 225 14,277.19 2,066.54 2,289.77
Income per capita 210 2,819.08 370 2,805.86 13.22 392.10 210 2,819.08 298 2,903.63 (84.55) 428.45 141 2,921.72 268 2,740.92 180.80 474.99 141 2,921.72 225 2,782.83 138.89 508.82
Expenditure 210 7,264.51 370 5,660.55 1,603.96 642.99 ** 210 7,264.51 298 5,538.19 1,726.32 697.02 *** 141 7,003.81 268 5,140.14 1,863.66 528.11 *** 141 7,003.81 225 4,866.60 2,137.20 533.48 ***
Expenditure per capita 210 1,253.74 370 1,082.22 171.52 119.49 * 210 1,253.74 298 1,065.98 187.76 127.53 * 141 1,265.16 268 992.22 272.94 116.72 *** 141 1,265.16 225 944.23 320.93 117.56 ***
Health 210 413.27 370 390.88 22.39 68.92 210 413.27 298 391.70 21.57 74.61 141 302.75 268 360.21 (57.46) 82.95 141 302.75 225 372.34 (69.59) 89.50
Health per capita 210 69.17 370 71.96 (2.79) 11.87 210 69.17 298 73.79 (4.61) 12.97 141 54.99 268 66.60 (11.60) 14.82 141 54.99 225 69.12 (14.13) 15.98
Education 210 1,124.26 370 800.03 324.24 188.08 ** 210 1,124.26 298 722.78 401.48 184.57 ** 141 1,156.60 268 704.93 451.67 212.48 ** 141 1,156.60 225 588.35 568.25 188.75 ***
Food 210 1,139.46 370 851.92 287.54 142.44 ** 210 1,139.46 298 795.55 343.91 150.83 ** 141 1,035.62 268 797.22 238.40 132.76 ** 141 1,035.62 225 705.00 330.63 128.96 ***
Food per capita 210 194.41 370 158.18 36.23 23.49 * 210 194.41 298 150.70 43.71 24.54 ** 141 184.97 268 153.54 31.43 26.42 141 184.97 225 139.96 45.01 26.11 **
Transportation 210 846.98 370 860.49 (13.51) 168.38 210 846.98 298 875.21 (28.23) 185.49 *** 141 812.27 268 771.99 40.28 147.55 141 812.27 225 759.12 53.15 158.21
Transportation per capita 210 146.57 370 172.36 (25.79) 33.86 210 146.57 297 177.76 (31.20) 37.27 ** 141 146.58 268 156.13 (9.55) 35.94 141 146.58 225 155.87 (9.29) 38.69
Energy 210 662.87 370 498.27 164.60 73.60 ** 210 662.87 298 497.68 165.20 81.42 ** 141 639.56 268 459.41 180.15 65.36 *** 141 639.56 225 453.86 185.70 70.20 ***
Energy per capita 210 115.23 370 94.91 20.32 13.03 * 210 115.23 298 95.33 19.90 14.35 * 141 114.22 268 88.65 25.57 12.69 ** 141 114.22 225 87.97 26.24 13.61 **
Water 210 352.38 370 300.69 51.69 44.69 210 352.38 298 294.91 57.47 48.22 141 343.00 268 276.81 66.19 36.57 ** 141 343.00 225 247.52 95.48 36.96 ***
Water per capita 210 60.05 370 57.32 2.73 8.09 210 60.05 298 56.67 3.38 8.65 141 59.55 268 55.11 4.44 7.66 141 59.55 225 49.43 10.12 7.68 *
Telephone 210 452.33 370 385.24 67.10 45.36 * 210 452.33 297 373.17 79.17 47.33 ** 141 422.06 268 367.27 54.79 45.96 141 422.06 225 351.20 70.86 45.24 *
Telephone per capita 210 76.79 370 74.75 2.03 9.09 210 76.79 297 73.40 3.39 9.22 141 75.05 268 71.01 4.04 9.63 141 75.05 225 67.79 7.26 9.13
Maintenance 210 353.62 370 320.48 33.14 186.14 210 353.62 298 347.82 5.80 207.15 141 330.14 268 174.22 155.92 39.71 *** 141 330.14 225 168.44 161.70 41.85 ***
Maintenance per capita 210 58.43 370 57.23 1.20 30.71 210 58.43 298 62.42 (4.00) 34.16 141 57.90 268 32.14 25.76 7.56 *** 141 57.90 225 31.22 26.69 7.91 ***
Other expenditures 210 1,919.32 370 1,256.99 662.34 201.05 *** 210 1,919.32 297 1,244.80 674.53 220.07 *** 141 1,961.82 268 1,228.08 733.73 263.96 *** 141 1,961.82 225 1,220.77 741.04 284.87 ***
Other expenditures per
capita
210 348.09 370 247.73 100.36 44.85 ** 210 348.09 297 246.81 101.29 48.76 ** 141 372.43 268 235.16 137.27 59.49 ** 141 372.43 225 235.59 136.85 64.43 **
Hospitalization 210 0.28 370 0.23 0.05 0.04 210 0.28 298 0.23 0.05 0.04 141 0.26 268 0.20 0.06 0.04 * 141 0.26 225 0.21 0.04 0.05
Rice 210 4,004.20 370 3,036.34 967.85 242.46 *** 210 4,004.20 298 2,970.02 1,034.18 262.45 *** 141 3,572.32 268 3,033.41 538.91 233.60 ** 141 3,572.32 225 2,979.67 592.65 243.69 ***
Rice per capita 210 667.87 370 572.09 95.79 40.51 *** 210 667.87 298 569.87 98.01 43.76 ** 141 646.95 268 559.63 87.31 46.13 ** 141 646.95 225 556.51 90.44 48.98 **
Cow 210 4.11 370 2.76 1.35 0.36 *** 210 4.11 298 2.78 1.33 0.38 *** 141 5.02 268 2.78 2.24 0.45 *** 141 5.02 225 2.92 2.11 0.48 ***
Poultry 210 15.43 370 11.97 3.46 1.23 *** 210 15.43 298 11.19 4.25 1.27 *** 141 15.29 268 12.23 3.06 1.54 ** 141 15.29 225 11.42 3.87 1.55 ***
3.2 Estimation model
For the cross-sectional observational study, the marginal causal effect
of intervention can be evaluated by three main approaches including instru-
mental variables (IV), regression discontinuity designs (RDD), and propen-
sity score method (White & Raitzer, 2017). Among the three approaches,
propensity score method is gaining widespread use in the non-experiment
evaluation literature due to data unavailability (Pirracchio et al., 2012). The
propensity score is the probability of treatment assignment conditional on
observed baseline covariates (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). There are four
techniques that the propensity score is used, the most common technique is
to match treated and untreated individuals on the propensity score, so-called
propensity score matching (PSM) (Haukoos & Lewis, 2015). The more re-
cent technique is called inverse probability of treatment weight (IPTW),
which subjects are weighted based on the estimated propensity score. The
basic idea of this technique is similar to sampling weight so that samples
are representative of a specific population (Morgan & Todd, 2008). Joffe et
al. (2004) illustrated how weighting by the inverse probability of treatment
can construct an artificial population in which baseline covariates are not
systematically correlated with treatment assignment. One advantage of the
IPTW technique is that we can directly check and ensure the balance of the
baseline covariates between treated and untreated groups (Linden & Adams,
2012). Unlike PSM, IPTW maximizes data available. Austin (2010) showed
empirical evidence that IPTW outperforms the other three propensity score
techniques. Additionally, Austin (2013) suggested that the IPTW technique
performs better precision than the PSM technique. In spite of the rapidly
increasing application of IPTW in recent years, especially in the field of
health economics (Vaughan et al., 2015; Maeda et al., 2016; Nielsen et al.,
2017), it is still scarce in the health insurance setting.
As a matter of fact, the CBHI scheme in Lao PDR was established for
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particularly self-employed households of which the screening of the benefi-
ciaries is on a voluntary basis. Due to the self-selection bias associated with
non-experimental data, to compare the outcomes between treated house-
holds (CBHI households) and untreated households (non-CBHI households)
will result in biased estimates of the schemes effect. Therefore, in the ab-
sence of experimental data, we employ the IPTW technique to evaluate the
impact of the CBHI scheme on hospitalization, income, various expenditure
categories, rice yield, and livestock holdings of CBHI households in rural
Lao PDR. Following Joffe et al. (2004), the IPTW technique follows four
steps to estimate the average treatment on the treated (ATT) as follows:
1 To examine whether the impact of the CBHI scheme is prone to be
confounded, we regress single potential covariates on the treatment
dummy as the following equation (Linden & Adams, 2012):
X = β0 + β1T (1)
where X is each covariate. T is treatment. β1 is not significantly
different from zero if X is considered balanced between treated and
untreated groups.
2 Then, these potential covariates are used to estimate the propensity
score. Let the probability that a household would enroll in the CBHI
scheme given the observed baseline covariates as p (x) ≡ Pr (T = 1 | X),
the score can be estimated as follows:
logit {Pr (T = 1 | X)} = Xβ (2)
X is a vector of the observed baseline covariates.
As our interest is the impact of the CBHI scheme on the CBHI house-
holds, based on the estimated propensity score, pˆ (x), the inverse prob-
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ability of treatment weight for ATT estimation is defined as follows
(Austin & Stuart, 2015):
wi = Ti + (1− Ti) pˆ (x)i
(1− pˆ (x)i)
(3)
where wi is the weight of household i. Note that, for treated households
(Ti = 1), wi = 1 and untreated households (Ti = 0), wi =
pˆ(x)i
(1−pˆ(x)i)
.
This weight sets the treated households as the reference population.
3 We repeat the first step over with weight to construct an artificial
population in which single potential covariates are independent of the
treatment assignment.
4 Finally, ATT is estimated using the weighting technique (Lunceford &
Davidian, 2004; Austin & Stuart, 2017).
ATTIPTW =
1
N1
N1∑
i=1
wiYi − 1
N0
N0∑
i=1
wiYi (4)
where Yi is the outcome of household i. N1 and N0 are the number of
CBHI households and non-CBHI households, respectively.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Estimation results
To estimate ATT that is not confounded, we need to eliminate the
covariate imbalances as summarized in Table 2 by propensity score weight-
ing. Table 3 shows the results of step 1 and step 3 as mentioned in the
estimation model section. The four left-hand-side columns right after the
covariates column are unweighted estimates and the four right-hand-side
columns are estimates weighted by the propensity score between treated
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and untreated households. As shown, the unweighted estimates report the
statistically significant imbalances of many baseline covariates. The CBHI
households are more likely to have a more educated household head, larger
household members, more toilets at home, more engaged in the village party
and women union, and CBHI households tend to live in the villages that are
relatively closer to the district hospital. However, once the weight is used,
the imbalances are all removed. We now ensure that the ATT estimates are
less confounding by the selected covariates.
Table 3: Covariate weighting
Covariates Unweighted Weighted
Full Subsample Subsample Subsample Full Subsample Subsample Subsample
sample 1 2 3 sample 1 2 3
(579) (507) (408) (365) (579) (507) (408) (365)
Gender -0.0979 -0.105 -0.405 -0.419 -0.0114 -0.0231 0.0502 0.133
(0.238) (0.249) (0.283) (0.295) (0.261) (0.282) (0.320) (0.348)
Age 1.982 * 2.492 ** 0.418 0.686 -0.192 -0.382 -0.463 -0.746
(1.158) (1.197) (1.431) (1.466) (1.216) (1.322) (1.500) (1.586)
Education 0.927 *** 1.145 *** 1.388 *** 1.638 *** -0.126 -0.19 -0.313 -0.453
(0.333) (0.342) (0.398) (0.405) (0.406) (0.488) (0.508) (0.642)
Size 0.704 *** 0.754 *** 0.512 ** 0.523 ** 0.0251 0.0333 -0.021 -0.0354
(0.184) (0.195) (0.221) (0.231) (0.215) (0.236) (0.261) (0.293)
Land 96.108 -635.833 628.894 -96.206 840.8 1,234 487 1,263
(1,904.94) (2,067.75 (2,479.48) (2,637.02) (1,945) (2,067) (3,238) (3,094)
Toilet 0.958 *** 1.133 *** 1.543 *** 1.675 *** 0.0183 0.0382 -0.00326 -0.00236
(0.230) (0.235) (0.342) (0.345) (0.241) (0.253) (0.355) (0.367)
Village party 0.0595 *** 0.0631 *** 0.0545 ** 0.0548 ** 0.00985 0.0269 0.0148 0.0327
(0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.038) (0.035)
Women union 0.0871 ** 0.101 *** 0.118 *** 0.137 *** -0.00923 -0.00993 -0.0187 -0.0243
(0.037) (0.038) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.050) (0.057) (0.064)
α 0.0528 * 0.0536 * 0.0256 0.0117 -0.0091 -0.0131 -0.021 -0.0286
(0.029) (0.030) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.046)
Distance -1.571 *** -1.966 *** -2.172 *** -2.56 *** 0.0592 0.171 0.0347 0.102
(0.463) (0.479) (0.547) (0.564) (0.400) (0.419) (0.426) (0.437)
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
The estimates of ATT for the full sample and subsamples are reported
in Table 45. Subsample 3 is particularly the center of our interest because
both CBHI ex-members and VF subjects are excluded. As a sensitivity
analysis, we report the estimates from four models with different covariate
combinations. The same models are applied across the four categories of
samples to allow the ATT estimates to be compared.
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Table 4: ATT estimates based on the IPTW method
Full sample (579) Subsample 1 (507)a Subsample 2 (408) Subsample 3 (365)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Income 520.7 560.0 1,056 1,357 -710.9 -712.2 297.1 530.1 -1,127 -895.4 571.6 204.4 -2,577 -2,417 294.3 -295.7
(1,820) (1,823) (1,697) (1,702) (2,243) (2,275) (1,934) (1,983) (2,493) (2,473) (1,961) (2,250) (3,171) (3,253) (2,131) (2,613)
Income per capita -45.35 -31.44 113.9 126.9 -282.1 -276.4 -6.884 -24.02 -323.7 -278.2 70.86 -39.62 -629.5 -620.2 16.74 -160.4
(366.7) (371.0) (319.1) (335.7) (469.8) (481.1) (363.7) (400.9) (558.9) (558.2) (414.2) (494.6) (731.3) (751.4) (452.4) (585.8)
Expenditure 959.4* 907.3 908.5 1,018* 1,114* 979.9 879.0 1,077* 777.5 710.5 965.3* 914.6 1,128* 1,051* 1,170** 1,140*
(542.8) (558.1) (591.0) (539.4) (588.0) (629.1) (675.5) (589.4) (595.3) (585.9) (582.3) (585.9) (630.9) (632.7) (596.2) (610.8)
Expenditure per capita 153.5 147.1 163.0 170.6* 180.8* 160.7 165.0 181.6* 139.5 129.3 186.9 172.4 201.8 181.1 226.8* 209.0
(101.1) (103.1) (106.4) (99.93) (108.8) (114.7) (117.3) (107.5) (127.9) (125.5) (123.1) -124.9 (135.3) (135.1) (123.5) (129.9)
Health -3.744 -22.73 -18.27 -23.64 -12.02 -37.91 -32.96 -48.70 -88.97 -115.0 -110.5 -120.3 -110.8 -143.1 -148.5 -169.3
(71.38) (76.10) (74.54) (76.36) (83.05) (90.62) (87.14) (91.63) (82.38) (92.62) (90.48) (95.04) (100.5) (114.3) (112.8) (122.6)
Health per capita -0.950 -3.753 -2.797 -4.212 -2.962 -6.869 -5.917 -9.015 -11.59 -16.33 -15.57 -17.20 -14.90 -20.78 -21.78 -25.26
(11.67) (12.41) (12.14) (12.49) (13.73) (14.91) (14.29) (15.12) (14.27) (15.78) (15.55) (16.31) (17.18) (19.33) (19.13) (20.78)
Education 146.6 156.7 180.0 157.5 219.6 219.3 240.9 167.3 206.2 191.9 266.2 247.1 339.6 329.5 380.5 308.9
(202.8) (202.6) (204.2) (201.5) (206.3) (206.3) (206.5) (216.5) (252.3) (253.0) (250.2) (239.4) (242.0) (239.7) (233.2) (242.0)
Food 101.8 107.4 102.7 115.8 200.5 201.6 146.5 221.7 18.22 16.39 115.7 67.07 178.5 194.4 232.3 223.6
(160.0) (164.4) (187.5) (164.4) (172.3) (180.4) (228.8) (178.1) (165.7) (164.7) (157.0) (164.5) (158.2) (155.4) (156.2) (155.6)
Food per capita 18.25 20.06 22.68 22.02 32.07 32.44 29.03 36.76 -3.755 0.448 14.98 6.287 22.44 24.73 31.82 29.71
(25.82) (26.07) (27.66) (26.24) (26.71) (27.54) (31.62) (27.44) (34.05) (31.20) (31.44) (32.97) (31.81) (30.99) (31.86) (32.18)
Transportation -20.82 -45.38 -56.27 -9.852 -16.10 -63.82 -87.38 -6.396 -52.07 -82.92 -55.41 -41.79 -47.24 -72.27 -53.86 -31.26
(119.5) (129.6) (133.3) (114.7) (143.7) (162.8) (164.8) (135.0) (149.1) (155.9) (130.9) (137.9) (195.1) (204.2) (151.2) (165.1)
Transportation per capita -11.60 -16.63 -14.18 -9.158 -12.97 -22.75 -19.37 -10.41 -18.92 -25.02 -14.01 -16.43 -22.78 -29.18 -15.64 -18.81
(23.54) (25.82) (23.87) (22.42) (29.21) (33.36) (28.75) (26.80) (34.37) (36.13) (26.99) (31.54) (45.98) (48.55) (31.06) (38.67)
Energy 114.3 95.86 84.66 107.1 85.63 58.78 41.52 78.23 118.1 112.1 71.67 110.5 102.0 94.53 50.83 98.64
(74.47) (80.43) (91.65) (77.29) (88.70) (99.52) (118.4) (93.87) (74.97) (75.74) (108.8) (77.81) (81.63) (83.58) (125.0) (82.76)
Energy per capita 20.64 17.73 19.13 20.37 16.06 11.79 13.70 15.89 19.96 18.47 17.75 19.93 16.37 14.00 15.23 17.15
(12.73) (13.57) (13.60) (12.80) (14.84) (16.43) (16.20) (15.01) (14.89) (15.16) (15.68) (14.55) (17.15) (17.65) (17.11) (15.88)
Water 25.57 25.57 33.05 35.05 44.36 43.22 51.10 56.21 16.31 6.263 55.19 34.62 43.69 41.08 85.57** 70.00*
(37.64) (38.22) (41.54) (37.50) (38.15) (41.38) (44.85) (38.54) (39.17) (38.89) (38.55) (38.49) (39.09) (39.58) (39.09) (38.68)
Water per capita 4.083 3.685 5.663 6.065 6.157 5.866 7.388 8.624 -0.470 -2.563 5.731 2.872 4.061 3.069 10.67 9.050
(6.443) (6.599) (6.959) (6.382) (6.646) (7.202) (7.696) (6.692) (7.551) (7.560) (7.538) (7.471) (7.646) (7.880) (7.784) (7.578)
Telephone 47.24 44.38 50.40 52.49 67.62 59.89 61.39 69.85 2.718 -1.198 21.58 14.16 28.09 24.83 35.38 32.72
(46.28) (46.28) (45.95) (45.65) (50.38) (50.44) (49.99) (48.87) (48.70) (48.98) (46.86) (46.83) (53.76) (54.27) (49.72) (49.51)
Telephone per capita 5.099 5.016 6.249 6.165 7.984 7.187 7.700 8.804 -0.485 -0.952 3.010 1.767 4.133 3.539 5.638 5.389
(8.204) (8.135) (7.975) (8.046) (8.729) (8.579) (8.393) (8.340) (9.343) (9.338) (8.797) (8.918) (9.942) (9.798) (8.931) (9.049)
Mainteanance 53.06 37.53 11.51 53.41 54.69 17.46 -18.58 38.09 119.7** 113.7** 118.7** 110.1** 136.8*** 129.2** 117.2** 108.6**
(111.0) (123.6) (141.9) (108.2) (119.6) (148.4) (175.2) (123.2) (49.53) (49.67) (49.29) (49.36) (51.10) (52.21) (51.93) (52.22)
Maintenane per capita 8.099 5.706 1.508 8.107 8.022 2.119 -4.012 5.182 22.12** 20.85** 21.62** 20.15** 25.39*** 23.68** 21.50** 20.14**
(17.32) (19.48) (22.64) (16.77) (18.85) (23.80) (28.35) (19.43) (9.028) (8.965) (8.779) (8.939) (9.192) (9.259) (9.042) (9.343)
Other expenditures 494.4** 507.3** 518.8** 528.7** 468.1* 480.7* 474.2* 498.8* 437.3 469.3 482.3 493.3 457.1 452.5 470.4 497.8
(240.5) (221.3) (225.3) (231.5) (273.9) (251.7) (247.6) (258.6) (333.7) (306.5) (307.1) (318.2) (351.0) (351.9) (317.9) (332.1)
Other expenditures per
capita
95.87* 100.3** 104.9** 102.7** 92.76 97.73* 99.62* 99.32* 101.5 107.6 114.9 113.2 103.4 102.0 112.4 112.3
(52.84) (49.11) (49.51) (51.23) (58.92) (54.29) (52.77) (56.03) (76.01) (70.84) (70.48) (73.31) (79.39) (78.90) (71.85) (75.80)
Hospitalization 0.0449 0.0454 0.0294 0.0392 0.0467 0.0435 0.0366 0.0513 0.0575 0.0647 0.0547 0.0625 0.0248 0.0359 0.0317 0.0403
(0.0404) (0.0398) (0.0410) (0.0404) (0.0433) (0.0428) (0.0432) (0.0422) (0.0489) (0.0469) (0.0478) (0.0473) (0.0546) (0.0517) (0.0508) (0.0506)
Rice 654.6** 640.0** 645.7** 677.8** 686.3** 660.5** 654.0** 714.5** 228.7 161.3 214.2 282.3 278.6 212.8 263.9 365.8
(285.5) (285.4) (279.6) (282.6) (304.7) (303.1) (290.6) (298.0) (274.3) (269.0) (261.2) (261.0) (306.1) (296.8) (272.6) (275.5)
Rice per capita 109.7*** 107.6*** 110.8*** 110.3*** 112.8** 110.2** 109.8** 112.2** 93.28* 77.21 89.02* 95.14* 100.2* 82.42 93.04* 103.8**
(41.56) (41.59) (41.21) (41.51) (44.32) (44.12) (42.89) (44.03) (50.02) (48.29) (48.20) (48.59) (54.00) (51.95) (50.16) (51.46)
Cow 1.098*** 1.095*** 0.987** 1.124*** 1.143*** 1.078** 0.853* 1.090** 1.968*** 1.996*** 1.819*** 2.015*** 1.976*** 1.937*** 1.625*** 1.968***
(0.404) (0.399) (0.420) (0.412) (0.443) (0.446) (0.478) (0.469) (0.502) (0.501) (0.523) (0.504) (0.540) (0.548) (0.571) (0.547)
Poultry 1.882 2.010 1.732 1.919 2.640* 2.565* 2.420* 2.585* 1.001 1.176 0.909 0.999 1.818 2.076 1.777 1.827
(1.405) (1.383) (1.395) (1.395) (1.474) (1.449) (1.449) (1.456) (1.795) (1.755) (1.770) (1.767) (1.924) (1.851) (1.838) (1.864)
Robust standard errors in parentheses a Subsample 1: Full sample - Ex-members Subsample 3: Full sample - Ex-members -Subjects engaged in village fund
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1 Subsample 2: Full sample - Subjects engaged in village fund
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For direct outcomes, we find no evidence of the CBHI scheme impact
on health expenditures and hospitalization. The estimates show consistent
signs as expected but fail to reject the null hypothesis. Such findings are
consistent regardless of the presence of the VF subjects but no ex-members
in subsample 1, including ex-members but no VF subjects in subsample 2,
and the absence of both CBHI ex-members and VF subjects in subsample
3.
For indirect outcomes, however, the results show positive impacts of
the scheme on rice production per capita in the full sample and all subsam-
ples. Although the significance level fades away in model 2 of subsample
2 and 3, which VF subjects are not included, it might be caused by fewer
baseline covariates controlled. To be more precise, the rice yields per capita
increase on average over 80 kg per year. The effect is slightly magnified and
the significance level increases significantly when VF subjects are pooled in
the samples. As the fact that rice production is the function of not only
labor supply but also capital.
Further, we also find strong and robust evidence that the scheme sig-
nificantly increases the number of cow holdings. The impacts are rather sim-
ilar irrespective of whether CBHI ex-members are present or not. The CBHI
households own almost two cows more than non-CBHI households. More
interestingly, the effect is stronger in the absence of VF subjects than the
presence of VF subjects in the samples. The findings support our hypothe-
ses that the CBHI scheme leads to an increase in agriculture production and
livestock holdings of CBHI enrolled households in rural Lao PDR.
4.2 Robustness confirmation
To reinforce our findings, the robustness of the IPTW estimates is
checked with an alternative measurement method, coarsened exact matching
(CEM), which is a causal inference without balancing check (Iacus, 2012).
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The ATT estimates based on the CEM method is presented in Appendix B.
The findings show a consistent sign and significance level, only the degree of
effects slightly varies. Overall, the estimates by the CEM method provides
supporting evidence for the robustness perspective.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the CBHI scheme on house-
hold welfare, focusing on indirect impacts on rice production and livestock
holdings. We use household surveys in rural villages of Savannakhet Province,
Lao PDR, to test the null hypothesis. Based on the fact that the CBHI is
a voluntary-based scheme, self-selection bias may exist. To this end, we
employ the technique of inverse probability of treatment weight (IPTW) to
mitigate for imbalances in pre-intervention covariates between treated and
untreated samples. Our analysis suggests that the CBHI scheme has nei-
ther direct impacts on health expenditure nor hospitalization. In contrast,
we find that there are substantial indirect impacts of participation in the
CBHI scheme on rice yield per capita and cow holdings. Such findings pos-
sibly reflect the fast recovery of illness, improved health status of household
members, or lower incidence of catastrophic healthcare expenditure among
CBHI households.
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The empirical evidences in this study suggests the potential benefits
of the CBHI scheme on agricultural production and livestock holdings, which
both are likely to lead to poverty reduction in the long-run. Further, the
lack of significant evidence on direct benefits of the scheme might be a
reason explained why the current CBHI scheme has received less popularity
from informally employed households. To encourage more enrollment, it
is important to understand the preferences of potential enrollees towards
the hypothetical CBHI scheme. In addition, supply-side improvement, such
as quality of service and geographic access, is also critical to scale-up the
scheme.
There are some limitations to this study. First, to observe the direct
impacts we fail to capture the frequency of health care seeking and the
frequency of hospitalization. Second, we use quantity instead of a monetary
value of livestock holdings in analysis.
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Notes
1However, CBHI coverage in Champhone and Xaibouly Districts accounted for only
0.21% and 0.1% of the province population in 2015, respectively.
2Lao Statistics Bureau classifies villages into three types: Village type I indicates an
urban village with road access, electricity, water supply, regular market, and administra-
tive office; Village type II is a rural village with road access; and Village type III is a rural
village without road access. “1 1 0 1 1 1 0” condition indicates road access (yes), elec-
tricity (yes), health care facility (no), clean water (yes), village drug kits (yes), primary
school (yes), and regular market (no).
3Household is defined as a group of people in a housing unit living together as a family
and sharing the same kitchen.
4The village fund program is available in all eight selected villages of our study, the
program targets the similar group of population with the CBHI scheme. The unit of
enrollment is household. However, the program is implemented by different organizations.
5See Appendix A for covariate balancing of the selected models.
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Appendix A: Covariate balancing for ATT estimation
Covariates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Standardized
differences
Variance ratio Standardized
differences
Variance ratio Standardized
differences
Variance ratio Standardized
differences
Variance ratio
Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched Raw Matched
Full sample
Gender -0.035 -0.006 1.072 1.011 -0.035 0.003 1.072 0.994 -0.035 0.000 1.072 1.000
Age 0.150 -0.015 0.799 0.823 0.150 0.009 0.799 0.861 0.150 -0.011 0.799 0.837
Education 0.244 -0.027 0.833 0.670 0.244 -0.005 0.833 0.689
Size 0.322 0.009 1.274 1.139 0.322 0.008 1.274 1.133 0.322 -0.010 1.274 1.112 0.322 0.011 1.274 1.154
Land 0.004 0.044 0.818 0.901
Toilet 0.388 0.009 0.573 0.981 0.388 0.012 0.573 0.976 0.388 0.007 0.573 0.986 0.388 0.010 0.573 0.979
Distance -0.309 0.018 0.477 0.683 -0.309 0.017 0.477 0.667 -0.309 0.022 0.477 0.689
Village party 0.233 0.032 2.313 1.093 0.233 0.053 2.313 1.161 0.233 -0.008 2.313 0.978 0.233 0.018 2.313 1.049
Women union 0.200 -0.023 1.263 0.980 0.200 -0.029 1.263 0.975 0.200 0.011 1.263 1.010 0.200 -0.012 1.263 0.989
α 0.162 -0.023 1.099 0.970 0.162 -0.009 1.099 0.980 0.162 -0.010 1.099 0.988
Subsample 1
Gender -0.038 -0.008 1.077 1.015 -0.038 -0.010 1.077 1.019 -0.038 -0.011 1.077 1.020
Age 0.189 -0.028 0.808 0.848 0.189 0.002 0.808 0.871 0.189 -0.026 0.808 0.857
Education 0.303 -0.036 0.859 0.631 0.303 0.006 0.859 0.663
Size 0.341 0.012 1.228 1.091 0.341 0.003 1.228 1.065 0.341 -0.004 1.228 1.062 0.341 0.021 1.228 1.130
Land -0.029 0.061 0.712 0.899
Toilet 0.472 0.019 0.536 0.961 0.472 0.025 0.536 0.950 0.472 0.013 0.536 0.974 0.472 0.020 0.536 0.959
Distance -0.383 0.039 0.465 0.711 -0.383 0.025 0.465 0.680 -0.383 0.039 0.465 0.713
Village party 0.251 0.089 2.527 1.299 0.251 0.095 2.527 1.327 0.251 0.025 2.527 1.071 0.251 0.051 2.527 1.156
Women union 0.233 -0.024 1.326 0.980 0.233 -0.022 1.326 0.981 0.233 0.003 1.326 1.002 0.233 -0.025 1.326 0.979
α 0.166 -0.032 1.093 0.902 0.166 0.006 1.093 0.967 0.166 -0.001 1.093 0.950
Subsample 2
Gender -0.146 0.020 1.325 0.969 -0.146 0.002 1.325 0.997 -0.146 0.001 1.325 0.998
Age 0.031 -0.048 0.815 0.871 0.031 -0.004 0.815 0.911 0.031 -0.035 0.815 0.878
Education 0.368 -0.067 0.857 0.634 0.368 -0.035 0.857 0.645
Size 0.235 -0.008 1.084 0.986 0.235 -0.002 1.084 1.016 0.235 -0.016 1.084 0.937 0.235 -0.001 1.084 0.999
Land 0.026 0.027 1.031 0.762
Toilet 0.555 0.004 0.354 0.987 0.555 0.011 0.354 0.966 0.555 0.002 0.354 0.995 0.555 0.014 0.354 0.958
Distance -0.440 0.008 0.425 0.801 -0.440 0.012 0.425 0.809 -0.440 -0.002 0.425 0.802
Village party 0.211 0.050 2.091 1.154 0.211 0.045 2.091 1.135 0.211 0.002 2.091 1.006 0.211 0.015 2.091 1.043
Women union 0.268 -0.040 1.351 0.971 0.268 -0.035 1.351 0.974 0.268 0.014 1.351 1.011 0.268 0.002 1.351 1.001
α 0.089 -0.058 0.922 0.799 0.089 -0.004 0.922 0.863 0.089 -0.013 0.922 0.836
Subsample 3
Gender -0.151 0.054 1.338 0.919 -0.151 0.016 1.338 0.975 -0.151 0.018 1.338 0.971
Age 0.051 -0.063 0.826 0.918 0.051 -0.013 0.826 0.925 0.051 -0.051 0.826 0.905
Education 0.438 -0.087 0.886 0.570 0.438 -0.037 0.886 0.599
Size 0.237 -0.011 1.044 0.937 0.237 0.006 1.044 0.964 0.237 -0.017 1.044 0.886 0.237 0.000 1.044 0.963
Land -0.004 0.053 0.938 0.828
Toilet 0.618 0.007 0.336 0.977 0.618 0.020 0.336 0.939 0.618 0.000 0.336 1.000 0.618 0.022 0.336 0.935
Distance -0.513 0.020 0.411 0.822 -0.513 0.011 0.411 0.809 -0.513 0.004 0.411 0.808
Village party 0.212 0.111 2.102 1.400 0.212 0.093 2.102 1.320 0.212 0.017 2.102 1.046 0.212 0.040 2.102 1.118
Women union 0.317 -0.047 1.457 0.966 0.317 -0.032 1.457 0.977 0.317 0.007 1.457 1.006 0.317 -0.007 1.457 0.995
α 0.046 -0.079 0.847 0.702 0.046 0.004 0.847 0.805 0.046 -0.009 0.847 0.759
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Appendix B: ATT estimates based on the CEM method
Full sample (579) Subsample 1 (507)a Subsample 2 (408) Subsample 3 (365)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Income -4,754 -1,558 1,345 -0.782 -3,924 -5,144 -116.7 -116.7 -2,282 -1,953 415.9 415.9 -3,503 -2,228 456.9 456.9
(4,039) (2,793) (2,033) (2,276) (6,021) (3,691) (2,160) (2,160) (4,321) (2,928) (2,316) (2,316) (4,589) (3,147) (2,392) (2,392)
Income per capita -1,175 -568.6 40.85 -329.2 -1,188 -1,185 -166.7 -166.7 -848.0 -480.9 -67.14 -67.14 -836.6 -559.2 -134.3 -134.3
(949.7) (624.2) (409.8) (518.1) (1,507) (802.7) (429.6) (429.6) (1,061) (668.1) (520.1) (520.1) (1,075) (719.6) (537.5) (537.5)
Expenditure 55.81 716.3 922.9 871.6 1,396 408.6 1,233 1,233 464.2 567.5 1,205* 1,205* 1,043 808.1 1,597** 1,597**
(884.2) (649.8) (721.5) (740.1) (875.6) (985.4) (780.3) (780.3) (804.7) (682.6) (647.6) (647.6) (900.7) (706.0) (623.6) (623.6)
Expenditure per capita -39.33 68.27 121.6 64.55 210.1 18.52 188.6 188.6 -25.80 107.8 201.3 201.3 149.8 143.6 228.5 228.5
(180.5) (130.2) (136.9) (155.5) (205.4) (185.3) (139.6) (139.6) (189.3) (143.5) (141.2) (141.2) (199.3) (147.8) (142.5) (142.5)
Health -55.17 13.86 -9.777 -15.84 -63.01 -4.242 3.887 3.887 -19.20 -109.4 -134.5 -134.5 -137.3 -131.8 -149.8 -149.8
(98.80) (80.10) (81.36) (90.17) (85.91) (92.63) (85.26) (85.26) (85.83) (99.39) (89.57) (89.57) (124.4) (111.5) (112.3) (112.3)
Health per capita -5.281 1.822 -2.489 -2.998 -8.256 -1.332 -0.630 -0.630 -1.360 -15.43 -17.69 -17.69 -15.80 -19.43 -24.37 -24.37
(17.04) (13.05) (13.75) (15.62) (15.63) (15.72) (14.38) (14.38) (16.07) (16.92) (15.56) (15.56) (21.05) (18.85) (19.33) (19.33)
Education 151.5 134.3 125.0 -143.0 439.0 311.5 321.3 321.3 262.0 183.1 398.2 398.2 623.9** 298.7 469.0* 469.0*
(303.5) (226.9) (245.1) (435.5) (295.2) (229.7) (221.9) (221.9) (304.7) (273.7) (263.7) (263.7) (266.1) (265.3) (246.2) (246.2)
Food -11.82 93.23 150.4 279.7* 226.6 218.9 96.68 96.68 59.59 99.92 234.5 234.5 155.9 198.5 239.2 239.2
(204.8) (182.2) (195.5) (165.4) (147.9) (158.5) (293.4) (293.4) (200.4) (153.8) (155.2) (155.2) (171.8) (153.5) (165.8) (165.8)
Food per capita 1.294 11.70 25.35 36.25 28.68 24.87 19.75 19.75 -10.32 13.77 33.08 33.08 11.16 26.66 24.11 24.11
(33.64) (30.44) (30.14) (30.06) (28.33) (28.53) (38.69) (38.69) (40.80) (29.89) (29.79) (29.79) (33.78) (30.56) (36.77) (36.77)
Transportation -316.2 -51.06 -122.6 -79.20 -241.8 -179.6 -113.5 -113.5 -444.7 -189.7 -91.67 -91.67 -187.5 -179.1 -15.19 -15.19
(295.6) (175.2) (171.9) (155.7) (423.4) (277.2) (184.8) (184.8) (312.1) (197.4) (161.9) (161.9) (279.1) (212.4) (156.0) (156.0)
Transportation per capita -87.52 -29.60 -37.71 -33.97 -82.27 -54.15 -36.87 -36.87 -118.0 -42.47 -30.07 -30.07 -50.47 -44.42 -23.31 -23.31
(68.25) (39.89) (34.83) (35.70) (106.2) (57.79) (37.17) (37.17) (77.92) (43.00) (38.47) (38.47) (66.64) (47.10) (39.17) (39.17)
Energy -33.72 115.2 87.91 88.55 66.42 22.33 122.3 122.3 -82.20 -9.260 45.06 45.06 -2.665 -15.67 200.2*** 200.2***
(114.9) (78.03) (94.55) (90.50) (145.3) (111.6) (89.46) (89.46) (116.8) (163.5) (126.1) (126.1) (162.8) (165.6) (74.50) (74.50)
Energy per capita -14.26 14.04 13.99 8.255 1.680 -1.652 18.59 18.59 -23.78 6.108 11.61 11.61 2.032 4.410 27.43* 27.43*
(23.09) (15.97) (16.38) (17.06) (34.01) (21.45) (16.26) (16.26) (24.10) (21.47) (18.41) (18.41) (26.87) (22.12) (16.13) (16.13)
Water -30.00 -4.609 16.42 -3.145 50.03 1.291 32.74 32.74 28.28 30.06 33.38 33.38 51.89 57.36 74.16* 74.16*
(58.14) (42.51) (48.86) (48.00) (51.67) (63.44) (51.60) (51.60) (48.20) (39.40) (39.76) (39.76) (46.24) (40.55) (41.17) (41.17)
Water per capita -8.235 -1.567 -1.721 -7.456 4.630 -2.783 1.707 1.707 -4.185 -0.619 0.835 0.835 1.853 4.040 7.231 7.231
(10.53) (7.426) (8.640) (8.595) (10.41) (11.03) (9.135) (9.135) (9.926) (8.462) (8.466) (8.466) (9.412) (8.822) (8.712) (8.712)
Telephone -36.18 32.03 34.67 8.779 43.57 -11.83 59.84 59.84 -32.97 19.62 21.94 21.94 18.59 29.42 53.53 53.53
(52.94) (47.91) (52.48) (51.54) (50.68) (55.48) (52.67) (52.67) (67.35) (48.34) (54.85) (54.85) (51.10) (50.56) (49.00) (49.00)
Telephone per capita -10.36 -1.309 2.734 -4.464 4.489 -8.890 6.283 6.283 -14.82 2.407 3.061 3.061 -0.154 4.022 4.224 4.224
(10.82) (9.694) (9.715) (10.17) (10.97) (11.38) (9.372) (9.372) (15.35) (9.400) (10.33) (10.33) (9.644) (9.580) (9.906) (9.906)
Mainteanance -161.1 57.22 -28.43 85.99 106.5** -132.8 -46.06 -46.06 95.68 117.6** 127.9** 127.9** 157.1*** 116.3** 98.06* 98.06*
(228.0) (126.6) (197.0) (125.3) (51.37) (293.1) (207.5) (207.5) (62.80) (49.30) (53.79) (53.79) (56.86) (51.37) (54.71) (54.71)
Maintenane per capita -25.66 7.066 -6.574 11.61 19.59* -23.44 -8.087 -8.087 12.68 21.49** 22.14** 22.14** 25.30** 21.30** 16.73 16.73
(38.25) (19.76) (31.98) (19.07) (10.58) (48.23) (33.75) (33.75) (13.35) (8.775) (9.345) (9.345) (10.67) (9.054) (10.33) (10.33)
Other expenditures 545.4** 321.9 668.5*** 648.0*** 763.1** 176.5 752.8*** 752.8*** 597.7** 425.5 569.9* 569.9* 363.0 434.3 627.9* 627.9*
(249.4) (330.2) (205.0) (232.6) (303.4) (409.4) (213.5) (213.5) (288.8) (372.8) (322.0) (322.0) (583.7) (394.2) (329.1) (329.1)
Other expenditures per
capita
106.9* 54.63 127.0** 119.2** 162.1** 38.56 141.8*** 141.8*** 102.0 90.37 119.4 119.4 74.15 89.26 121.1 121.1
(64.54) (72.50) (51.35) (58.74) (74.38) (85.94) (50.85) (50.85) (64.19) (84.89) (76.73) (76.73) (127.8) (88.81) (78.33) (78.33)
Hospitalization 0.0399 0.0490 0.00251 0.00943 0.0393 0.0559 0.0676 0.0676 0.0656 0.0746 0.0440 0.0440 0.0231 0.0476 0.0690 0.0690
(0.0536) (0.0435) (0.0454) (0.0513) (0.0675) (0.0496) (0.0441) (0.0441) (0.0579) (0.0479) (0.0506) (0.0506) (0.0602) (0.0503) (0.0516) (0.0516)
Rice 618.5** 677.5** 744.9** 785.6** 755.3** 666.3** 614.2** 614.2** 548.2 173.7 369.5 369.5 556.5* 219.1 489.6* 489.6*
(309.6) (292.1) (294.4) (329.6) (375.5) (315.4) (274.7) (274.7) (341.1) (295.1) (300.1) (300.1) (333.4) (304.3) (294.4) (294.4)
Rice per capita 96.18* 94.97** 106.6** 98.12* 123.6* 108.9** 101.1** 101.1** 120.2* 75.22 98.31* 98.31* 108.7* 75.28 101.0* 101.0*
(56.04) (46.03) (49.33) (54.45) (66.75) (51.64) (48.91) (48.91) (64.14) (52.13) (53.43) (53.43) (65.36) (54.28) (58.06) (58.06)
Cow 1.357*** 1.047** 1.314*** 1.056** 1.449*** 1.102** 1.090** 1.090** 2.330*** 1.883*** 1.895*** 1.895*** 2.739*** 1.681** 1.854*** 1.854***
(0.478) (0.470) (0.446) (0.445) (0.500) (0.512) (0.444) (0.444) (0.603) (0.632) (0.611) (0.611) (0.559) (0.658) (0.544) (0.544)
Poultry 1.325 2.136 1.734 2.992* -0.146 1.686 1.960 1.960 -0.582 0.420 0.893 0.893 0.906 1.219 2.143 2.143
(1.790) (1.432) (1.500) (1.603) (2.208) (1.738) (1.564) (1.564) (2.127) (1.881) (1.924) (1.924) (2.402) (1.867) (1.870) (1.870)
Robust standard errors in parentheses a Subsample 1: Full sample - Ex-members Subsample 3: Full sample - Ex-members -Subjects engaged in village fund
*** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1 Subsample 2: Full sample - Subjects engaged in village fund
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